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WOMEN'S BODY IMAGE AND THE LAW
REENA N. GLAZER
Resistance can take the form of momentous acts of organized,
planned, and disciplined protests, or it may consist of small,
everyday actions of seeming insignificance that can nevertheless
validate the actor's sense of dignity and worth-such as refusing
on the basis of inferiority to give up 'a seat on a bus or covering
one's self in shame.
1
INTRODUCrION
On June 21, 1986, nine women exposed their breasts in a
secluded area of a public park in Rochester, New York.2 The
women appeared topless to express publicly their outrage against
New York Penal Law section 245.01, which imposes criminal sanc-
tions on women, but not men, who expose their bare chests in
public Seven of the women were arrested and charged with vio-
lating section 245.01.' The ensuing litigation spanned six years and
culminated in a decision by the Court of Appeals of the State of
New York, the state's highest court.5
1. Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and
Gender, 1991 DUKE LJ. 365, 396.
2. People v. Craft, 509 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1007 (Rochester City Ct. 1986), rev'd, 564
N.Y.S.2d 695 (Monroe County Ct. 1991), rev'd sub nom. People v. Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d
232 (N.Y. 1992).
3. Id. Under New York law,
[a] person is guilty of exposure if he appears in a public place in such a
manner that the private or intimate parts of his body are unclothed or exposed.
For purposes of this section, the private parts or intimate parts of a female per-
son shall include that portion of the breast which is below the top of the are-
ola. This section shall not apply to the breastfeeding of infants or to any per-
son entertaining or performing in a play, exhibition, show or entertainment.
Exposure of a person is a violation.
Nothing in this section shall prevent the adoption by a city, town or
village of a local law prohibiting exposure of a person as herein defined in a
public place, at any time, whether or not such person is entertaining or per-
forming in a play, exhibition, show or entertainment.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.01 (McKinney 1989).
4. Craft, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 1007.
5. People v. Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d 232 (N.Y. 1992).
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The women complained that the statute violated equal protec-
tion principles because it treated men and women differently for
no legitimate reason.6 The court reversed the women's convictions
but not on equal protection grounds. Instead, the court decided
that the law prohibiting public exposure of the female breast was
not meant to apply to this type of non-lewd behavior. Nonetheless,
the court upheld the statute.7
Although this case garnered a great deal of publicity and
media attention,. it failed (not surprisingly) to stimulate a massive
revolution in topless sunbathing by women on the beaches or in
the parks of New York.9 The significance of the decision rests
more in its symbolic power and the legal analyses employed. This
case is illustrative of the larger phenomenon of the law's impact
on women's images of their own bodies. Just as the law can influ-
ence people's behavior, if can influence how people feel about
themselves.
Women have a powerful psychological need to pursue and
preserve their beauty and to enhance their attractiveness. 10 One
noted psychologist has written that "[o]ur body image is at the
very core of our identity."'" Women have been shown to be
more sensitive and to attach more significance to body image than
men. 2 Not only do different cultures and races have unique and
specific ideas about what it means to be "attractive," 3 but these
6. It is well established that any law that discriminates between men and women
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment unless the govern-
ment can demonstrate that the gender-based classification is substantially related to
achieving an important government interest. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
7. Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d at 233-34.
8. For some examples, see Michelle Slatalla, Tops Drop, Gripes Grow, NEWSDAY,
July 23, 1992, at 4; Gary Spencer, Law Permits Bathing By Topless Women: Judges Point
to Noncommercial Conduct, N.Y. L.J., July 8, 1992, at 1; Michael Winerip, On Sunday:
Blazing Trails, Toplessly but Timidly, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1992, at A37. For a sampling
of editorials written about the case, see Alan M. Dershowitz, Cover Up!, NEWSDAY, July
29, 1992, at 38; Carlin Meyer, Women's Breasts: So What?, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1992, at
A21; Ellen Willis, Erroneous Zones, NEWSDAY, July 29, 1992, at 38.
9. Winerip, supra note 8, at A37. .
10. Adrian Furnham et al., Sex Differences in the Preferences for Specific Female
Body Shapes, 22 SEX ROLES 743, 744 (1990).
11. Judith Rodin, Body Mania, 25 PSYCHOL TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 56, 60 (1992).
12. Id. This differential is reflected in the fact that 90% of all anorexics are women.
See ROBERTA P. SFD, NEVER Too THIN: WHY WOMEN ARE AT WAR WrMI THEIR
BODIES 26 (1989).
13. Furnham et al., supra note 10, at 744.
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ideals change over time as well. Over the past fifty years, the
Western ideal of beauty has dictated a substantially thinner stan-
dard for the female body.14 This dramatic transformation in fe-
male body image has led to an obsession with body weight and
shape.'5
Studies have found that women continually distort their per-
ceived body shape and have extremely negative valuations of their
own bodies. 6 Such negative body images generate lower self-es-
teem and consume extraordinary amounts of time, energy, and
money. For example, at any given time, twenty-five percent of
women are on diets, and fifty percent are beginning, completing,
or cheating on one. 7 These statistics are punctuated by the fact
that the diet industry earns $33 billion a year. 8
This Note argues that the law has contributed to the creation
of an environment in which women are conditioned to hate their
bodies and strive for an unrealistic and unattainable ideal form.
Criminalizing the mere exposure of women's breasts while allowing
men to expose theirs sends a strong message to both women and
men as to how they should feel about women's bodies." It says
that women's bodies are to remain covered and hidden in public
14. See JOAN J. BRUMBERG, FASTING GIRLS: THE EMERGENCE OF ANOREXIA NER-
VOSA AS A MODERN DISEASE 20 (1988). Previously, the average female model weighed
8% less than the average American woman; today, she weighs 23% less than an average
woman. SEID, supra note 12, at 15.
15. See NAOMI WOLF, THE BEAUTY MYTH (1992) (chronicling the phenomenon of
society alienating women from their bodies and their sexuality). ,
16. This negativity is exemplified in a study of high school girls that found that 53%
of them are unhappy with their bodies by age 13, and that by age 18, 78% are unhappy.
In addition, a magazine survey of 33,000 women found that while only 25% of women
between the ages of 18 and 35 are medically overweight (the same percentage of men
who are overweight), 75% of women feel that they are fat. In addition, 45% of under-
weight women thought they were fat. See id. at 185.
17. SEID, supra note 12, at 3.
18. Molly O'Neill, Congress Looking into the Diet Business, N.Y. TIMES, March 28,
1990, at C12; Rodin, supra note 11, at 58-59. ("By the turn of the century we will be
spending $77 billion to lose weight-just slightly less than the entire gross national prod-
uct of Belgium.").
19. Criminal legal sanctions, unlike other penalties in American law, carry strong
moral and stigmatic overtones. "The stigma of condemnation is one of the distinctive
characteristics, if not the distinctive characteristic, differentiating the criminal law from
other kinds of legal sanctions." PETER W. Low ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 3-4 (2d ed. 1986).
The criminalization of women baring their breasts, therefore, indicates that society
views women's bodies as immoral and something to hide. There is something potentially
criminal about every woman just by virtue of being female.
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at all times.' The very sight of the bare breast is a crime, re-
gardless of the woman's intent.21 Exposure statutes are only one
example of the law's negative impact on women's body image.
This Note explores the broader relevance of People v. Santorelli
by discussing. other legal decisions that have been harmful to
women's body image.
This statutory double standard embodies the inequality be-
tween men and women in society. Men are free to expose their
chests in virtually any surroundings they choose with no consider-
ation of the impact on possible viewers. New York Penal Law
section 245.01, however, is written solely to take into account
potential viewers.' The focus is on the male response to viewing
topless women; there is no focus on the female actor herself.
This inverted structure of point of view 3 helps to maintain
men's objectification of women. Male power is perpetuated by
regarding women as objects that men act on and react to rather
than as actors themselves.' When women are regarded as ob-
jects, a great deal of importance rests on their appearances be-
cause their entire worth is derived from the reaction they can
induce from men. 5 In order to maintain the patriarchal system,
men must determine when and where this arousal is allowed to
take place. In this way, the (heterosexual) male myth of a
woman's breast has been codified into law. Because women are
the sexual objects and property of men, it follows that what might
arouse men can only be displayed when men want to be aroused.
For example, the statute contains an exemption for topless enter-
tainment, for which the audience is overwhelmingly male.26 In
20. That is, they are to be covered unless, as even the New York law makes clear, it
is for the purpose of entertaining (implicitly) men. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.01
(McKinney 1989).
21. Unless the woman's behavior falls under a specific exception, the exposure of her
breasts violates the New York law. The statute contains no mens rea requirement. See id.
22. It is not inevitable that public exposure statutes that are intended to "protect"
the public be constructed solely from the vantage point of potential viewers. For exam-
ples of exposure statutes that impose intent requirements that shift the focus back to the
actor, see discussion infra Section II(A).
23. For a discussion of the issues involving the point of view in this case, see infra
Section II(C).
24. Janet Rifkin, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, 3 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J.
83, 90-91 (1980).
25. Mary Whisner, Note, Gender-Specific Clothing Regulation: A Study in Patriarchy,
5 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 73, 77 (1982).
26. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.01 (McKinney 1989).
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adopting the statutory standard, no consideration was given to
contexts in which women might enjoy going topless for their own
reasons, regardless of any effect on male viewers'. Nor was any
consideration given to the fact that women might not be bothered
by the sight of other women's breasts. As this Note suggests,
women have actually been harmed by their isolation from other
women's bodies and by their lack of autonomy with regard to
their own bodies.'
Freeing women, as the Court of Appeals' decision does to a
certain extent, to control their own bodies and to not be ashamed
of them goes a long way toward creating a legal system that fos-
ters positive notions of women's body image and promotes equali-
ty in society. Although the practical outcome of People v.
Santorelli (creating exemptions from the statute for non-lewd top-
less activities, such as sunbathing)' was warranted, the court did
not go far enough in its analysis and reasoning. It should have
struck down New York Penal Law section 245.01 as a violation of
equal protection. There is no plausible justification for this legal
double standard.
Although the New York statute is blatantly discriminatory, the
methodology and analysis that should be used to achieve equality
are far from obvious. On the one hand, there is overwhelming evi-
dence that female and male breasts are more the same than differ-
ent.29 This similarity seems to mandate their equal treatment. On
the other hand, to argue that women are the same as men seems
to deny fundamental and obvious anatomical, biological, and de-
velopmental differences between men and women. This theoretical
sameness/difference debate has not been effective in grappling with
attempts to promote equality. In sameness/difference analysis, men
are the standard, leaving women always to be both "the same and
different: the same in their humanity, different in their anato-
my."'30 Under sameness theory, women can get equal treatment
only to the extent that they are the same as men. Not only does
this present the problem of using a male norm as the standard,31
27. See discussion infra subsection III(A)(4).
28. 600 N.E.2d 232, 233-34 (N.Y. 1992).
29. See infra Section I(D).
30. DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE
LAW 82 (1989).
31. See Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engen-
dered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10, 39, 61 (1987).
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but it leaves unaddressed, and therefore irreparable, all the various
situations in which women are different from men. Instead of
stressing sameness as the standard, an emphasis on "equal dignity"
is conceptually more appropriate.32 Difference theory also has its
problems. Proponents of difference theory advocate special treat-
ment, which often serves only to reinforce stereotypical notions
about women.33
This Note suggests that topless sunbathing is a good context
for a reconciliatory position. No one is claiming that women's
breasts are identical to men's--clearly, they are not. Likewise,
there is no request for any special treatment. Women are only
seeking the option to do what men are already free to do.' In
this context, although difference exists, it should not matter.35
This Note advocates a move toward a more context-specific analy-
sis of difference that does not reinforce stereotypes.36
Part I begins with a discussion of the legal background relat-
ing to People v. Santorelli. The legislative history of section 245.01
illustrates that the current law is a relatively new construction and
was not adopted without criticism. This Part details the multiple
litigation and court opinions that women who have exposed their
breasts have generated. A critical analysis of the Court of Appeals
decision is also offered. This Part suggests that it is clear from the
statutory history of section 245.01 that the court misread the stat-
ute in an effort to evade the more challenging equality issues and
proposes the equal protection analysis the court should have pur-
sued. In order to demonstrate how extreme the New York law is,
Part II presents a jurisdictional comparison of exposure statutes
and cases. Part III explores the broader societal importance of'
32. Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path
Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296, 308.
33. Id. at 310.
34. This argument is central to the sameness/difference debate: Does an argument
that women are only seeking the same rights as men help or harm women with more
significant and pronounced differences? For discussions of pregnancy (arguably the most
pronounced difference between men and women), see Henna Hill Kay, rI.uality and
Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1985); Wendy W.
Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate,
13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1984-1985).
35. RHODE, supra note 30, at 312-13 ("The difference dilemma cannot be resolved; it
can only be recast. The critical issue should not be difference, but the difference differ-
ence makes.").
36. Id. at 3-4 (requiring legal analysis to be contextual because "sex-based classifica-
tions often reinforce sex-based stereotypes").
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People v. Santorelli by analyzing the effects of requiring women to
cover their breasts in public on cosmetic surgery, breast-feeding,
and women's self-esteem. This Part also discusses other legal con-
texts in which the law has had a negative impact on women's body
image. The Note concludes that the law could have a positive
impact on women's body image by allowing choice and advocating
tolerance rather than by reinforcing monolithic and unobtainable
beauty norms.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Statutory History of New York Penal Law Section 245.01
Anti-exposure statutes have a long history in the penal law of
New York. New York adopted an "[e]xposure of person" law in
1881.' 7 In 1935, the state legislature added a statute prohibiting
nudity and nudist colonies.38
These early statutes made no explicit gender differentiation
and had an intent requirement: that exposure be committed "wil-
fully and lewdly. '39 Although it is not explicit in the statutory
history, at some point in time, allegedly in 1936, men fought for
and won the right to go shirtless in public.4"
The Revised Penal Law of 1965 recodified these earlier stat-
utes into section 245.00-"public lewdness" 41-which retained an
intent requirement and also made no gender distinction. The major
change occurred in 1967 with the enactment of section 245.01,
which was added specifically to cover "exposure of a female."'4
37. The 1881 law stated, "A person who willfully and lewdly exposes his person, or
the private parts thereof, in any public place, or in any place where others are present,
or procures another so as. to expose himself, is guilty of a misdemeanor." N.Y. PENAL
CODE § 316, 1881 N.Y. Laws 913.
38. 1935 N.Y. Laws 1663.
39. See N.Y. PENAL CODE § 316.
40. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 32, People v. Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d 232 (N.Y.
1992) (No. 115); Sonya Live (CNN television broadcast, July 23, 1992), available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, CNN file (comments of Betsy Gotbaum, New York City Parks
Commissioner, and Mary Lou Schloss, Defendant-Appellant).
41. The statute stated, "A person is guilty of public lewdness when, in a public
place, he intentionally exposes the private or intimate parts of his body in a lewd manner
or commits any other lewd act. Public lewdness is a class B misdemeanor." N.Y. REV.
PENAL CODE § 245.00 (McKinney 1965).
42. The 1967 law specified that
[a] female is guilty of exposure when, in a public place she appears clothed or
costumed in such a manner that the portion of her breast below the top of the
aureola [sic] is not covered with a fully opaque covering. This subdivision shall
1993]
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The New York legislature amended section 245.01 in 1970, to cor-
rect the spelling of the term "areola" and to add a clause allowing
local municipalities to enact even stricter prohibitions against fe-
male breast exposure.4 3 It is clear from the legislative history that
the "exposure of a female" statute was targeted specifically "at
discouraging 'topless' waitresses and their promoters."'  No inqui-
ry into the woman's purpose or intent is necessary; mere exposure
is sufficient to constitute a violation.
Prominent state officials voiced serious objections to the en-
actment of section 245.01 in 1967. For example, the Chairman of
the Committee on Criminal Courts, Law and Procedures of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Richard A.
Green, wrote to the governor's counsel:
We note that the bill, while apparently a response to the intro-
duction of "topless" waitresses in a cabaret in New York City,
affects the much wider area of public attitudes toward female
exposure, which are currently undergoing rapid and sometimes
bewildering changes. Some varieties of the "bikini" bathing suit,
which appear to have received acceptance, if not admiration, on
our public beaches over the last few years, reveal portions of the
breast below the top of the areola (although concealing the areo-
la itself) and would be prohibited by the proposed statute.
It is our view that the state's penal laws should not so
broadly and precisely attempt to dictate or stifle changes in pub-
lic taste as to female attire and exposure. We believe that Sec-
tion 245.00 [the Public Lewdness statute] is sufficient to deal with
the kind of exposure which community attitudes consider clearly
to be condemned, i.e., intentional exposure in a public place of
the private or intimate parts of the body in a lewd manner. We
not apply to any female entertaining or performing in a play, exhibition, show
or entertainment.
Exposure of a female is a violation.
1967 N.Y. Laws 1074, amended by 1970 N.Y. Laws 100, repealed by 1983 N.Y. Laws
1574.
43. The new clause stated that
[n]othing in this section shall prevent the adoption by a city, town or village of
a local law prohibiting the exposure of a female substantially as herein defined
in a public place, at any time, whether or not such female is entertaining or
performing in a play, exhibition, show or entertainment.
1970 N.Y. Laws 100-01, repealed by 1983 N.Y. Laws 1574.




believe that the underlined phrase is necessary in order to allow
for changing public tastes.45
Lawrence T. Kurlander, Commissioner of Criminal Justice Services,
wrote: "I have reservations about making mere nudity criminal and
I am concerned that such a general prohibition makes behavior
criminal that should not be."'  As these statements demonstrate,
contemporary commentators recognized that the statute's omission
of an intent requirement had troubling implications.
In approving the 1983 revision of the law, which is the current
form of the statute, Governor Mario Cuomo wrote that this provi-
sion would protect parents and children who use public beaches
and parks from the "discomfort caused by unwelcome public nudi-
ty."'47 This statement indicates that the legislature intended the
revised section 245.01 not to apply only to commercially motivated
activity, as the majority in People v. Santorelli contends,' but
specifically to prohibit topless sunbathing. Although there is no
lewdness requirement, the majority reads one into the statute. In
fact, the lewdness requirement is specifically covered in a separate
public lewdness statute-section 245.00.' 9 As the concurrence in
Santorelli recognizes, the majority's reading of section 245.01 to
incorporate a lewdness or intentional annoyance requirement is a
questionable interpretation because such a requirement is not
mentioned in the legislative history and would render section
245.00 redundant5 °
45. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 23, People v. Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d 232 (N.Y.
1992) (No. 115) (citation omitted).
46. IL at 24.
47. Message of the Governor, June 2, 1983, N.Y. LAWS, ch. 216, at 2756 (McKinney
1983).
48. Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d at 233.
49. The public lewdness statute states that
[a] person is guilty of public lewdness when he intentionally exposes the private
or intimate parts of his body in a lewd manner or commits any other lewd act
(a) in a public place, or (b) in private premises under circumstances in which
he may readily be observed from either a public place or from other private
premises, and with intent that he be so observed.
Public lewdness is a class B misdemeanor.
N.Y. Penal Law § 245.00 (McKinney 1989).
50. Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d at 235 (Titone, J., concurring).
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B. People v. Santorelli: Procedural History
Six months after the women's arrest for exposing their breasts
in violation of section 245.01, their case appeared before City
Court Judge Herman J. Walz in Rochester, New York. Although
the judge dismissed the charges, the decision was hardly the victo-
ry that the women were seeking.
Throughout the litigation, the women claimed that the law
violated their equal protection rights. They argued that because
the statute created a gender-based classification (whereby men can
go topless but women cannot), equal protection analysis applied5
and that the State had the burden of showing that the gender-
based classification was substantially related to the achievement of
an important government objective.52 The only objective the State
could argue in this case was the protection of public sensibili-
ties.53
Judge Walz decided that there was no equal protection viola-
tion, that the government objective was legitimate and that the
discriminatory means employed were appropriate to achieve this
objective.'
Today, community standards, as perceived by the Legislature,
regard the female breast as an intimate part of the human body.
Therefore, the state may legitimately enforce this standard by re-
quiring that the female breast not be exposed in public places.
Here, the statute's objective is to protect the public from
invasions of its sensibilities, and merely reflects current communi-
ty standards as to what constitutes nudity. The objective itself is
not based on stereotyped notions, therefore it is not illegitimate.
... [Clommunity standards do not deem the exposure of
males' breasts offensive, therefore the state does not have an
interest in preventing exposure of the males' breasts. A gender-
neutral statute which either required both men and women to
cover their breasts or eliminated the requirement for both sexes
51. Se4 e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
52. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
53. People v. Craft, 509 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1009-10 (Rochester City Ct. 1986), rev'd, 564





would not best serve the government's interest in preventing
exposure of the female breasts.5
The court's denial of the equal protection claims reinforced stereo-
typical thinking, although the court purported not to be influenced
by stereotypes. By relying on the highly questionable goal of pro-
tecting public sensibilities as a basis for the discrimination," the
court adopted the view that society needs protection from an
exposed female breast.
Judge Walz concluded, however, that section 245.01 was un-
constitutional as applied to the women because their First Amend-
ment right to protest the law outweighed the government's interest
in prohibiting exposure. Because the women issued press releases,
held organizational meetings, carried signs, and wore T-shirts with
a specific slogan, the judge held that their conduct was "over-
whelmingly imbued with communicative elements. 57
By deciding the case on First Amendment grounds, the court
frustrated the women's objective. First Amendment analysis limits
protection to formalized protests and grants no protection to wom-
en who wish to engage in topless activity for their own enjoyment.
None of the. federal courts that have addressed the constitutional-
ity of local ordinances banning nude sunbathing have been willing
to hold that nude sunbathing is an expression that the First
Amendment protects. 8 Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court has
held that nude dancing is not protected by the First Amend-
ment.59 Second, the women involved in these topless activities
were trying to show that their bodies were natural. They wanted
to be seen for who they were as individuals and not as walking
55. ld.
56. For a discussion of the issue of public sensibilities and stereotypical thinking, see
discussion infra Section I(D).
57. Craft, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 1013. The T-shirts had "a top-free Statue of Liberty, and
the slogan 'Equal rights now-shirtless equality 1986.'" Id.
58. See, eg., South Fla. Free Beaches, Inc. v. City of Miami, 548 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.
Fla, 1982), affd, 734 F.2d 608 (11th Cir. 1984); Chapin v. Town of Southampton, 457 F.
Supp. 1170 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Williams v. Hathaway, 400 F. Supp. 122 (D. Mass. 1975),
affd sub nora. Williams v. Kleppe, 539 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1976). See generally Richard B.
Kellam & Teri Scott Lovelace, To Bare or Not to Bare: The Constitutionality of Local
Ordinances Banning Nude Sunbathing, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 589, 627-28 (1986) (analyzing
the social nudism movement's arguments for overturning nudity bans).
59. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2457 (1991) (holding that an Indi-
ana public indecency statute requiring dancers at adult entertainment establishments to
wear panties and G-strings did not violate the First Amendment).
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breasts.' Women should not be given the freedom to use their
bodies only when their purpose is communicative in nature. First
Amendment analysis in this context only reinforces stereotypes:
the women did not want their bodies to make any special type of
statement, but the court was only willing to grant them freedom
when they became a cause celebre.
The State appealed the decision to the Monroe County
Court.61 Judge John J. Connell did not re-examine the trial
court's holding with regard to the equal protection claim. Howev-
er, he reversed the trial court on the First Amendment grounds
and remanded the case for further proceedings.62 The county
court held that the state regulations were appropriate time, place,
and manner restrictions.63 Because the women had other ways of
expiessing their opposition to the discriminatory statute, they did.
not have to resort to going topless in violation of the statute in
order to protest it.
On June 24, 1989, while still engaged in this litigation, two of
the appellants, Mary Lou Schloss and Ramona Santorelli, partici-
pated in another topless demonstration during a picnic at Durand-
Eastman Beach in Rochester, New York. On a hot day, about
twenty-five to thirty women removed their shirts and swam, sun-
bathed, and played volleyball. Sometime thereafter, the police
arrived and ordered the women to cover their breasts. The women
refused and were arrested, again charged with violating New York
Penal Law section 245.01.' No one had complained to the police;
thus it appears that no members of the public were offended.
Judge John Manning Regan of the Rochester City Court con-
victed the women for this, their second, violation of New York
60. Catharine MacKinnon writes,
We have had something to fight and therefore something to gain here,
and that is a different relation to our bodies than women are allowed to have
in this society. We have had to gain a relation to our bodies as if they are our
own . . . . It is our bodies as acting rather than as acted upon. It is our bodies
as being and presence, our bodies that we do things with, that we in fact are
and identify with as ourselves, rather than our bodies as things to be looked
at ....
CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
121 (1987).
61. People v. Craft, 564 N.Y.S.2d 695, 696 (Monroe County Ct. 1991), rev'd sub nom.
People v. Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d 232 (N.Y. 1992).
62. Id. at 697-98.
63. Id. at 698.
64. People v. David, 549 N.Y.S.2d 564, 564-65 (Rochester City Ct. 1989), rev'd, 585
N.Y.S.2d 149 (Monroe County Ct. 1991).
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Penal Law section 245.01. In upholding the constitutionality of the
statute, Judge Regan quoted extensively from the Book of Gene-
sis:
Nudity and morality are inextricably interwoven in the Judeo-
Christian ethic. The first book of the Bible-GENESIS-uses
nudity, and man's consciousness of it, to illustrate how mankind
acquired the knowledge of good and evil.
"So she took some of its fruit and ate it; and she also gave
some to her husband, who was with her, and he ate it.
7. Then the eyes of both of them were opened, and
they realized that they were naked, so they sewed fig leaves
together and made loin cloths for themselves.
8. When they heard the sound of the Lord God mov-
ing about in the garden at the breezy time of the day, the
man and his wife hid themselves from the Lord God among
the trees of the garden.
9. The Lord God then called to the man and asked
him 'Where are ybu?'
10. He answered; I heard you in the garden but I was
afraid, because I was naked, so I hid myself.
11. Then the Lord God asked: 'Who told you that you
were naked?' You have eaten then from the tree (of the
knowledge of good and evil) of which I have forbidden you
to eat!"
Nudity, accordingly, in the Judeo-Christian ethic, is a catalyst for
shame, and for immoral behavior. It triggers a compelling and
immediate choice between good and evil for anyone who possess-
es the knowledge of good and evil.6s
Leaving aside the constitutional infirmity of allowing a judge's
decision to rest on his reading of the Bible,' Judge Regan's fun-
damentalist conclusions are not necessarily the only ones the text
compels. Adam and Eve only came to the realization that some-
thing was wrong with being nude after they ate from the forbidden
tree, after they had sinned and destroyed their pristine innocence.
The text could just as validly convey the message that nudity is
65. Id. at 567 (quoting Genesis 3:6-11).
66. Although this reference appears to raise Establishment Clause problems, judicial
reliance on and quotation from the Bible seems to be fairly common. J. Michael Medina,
The Bible Annotated: Use of the Bible in Reported American Decisions, 12 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 187, 187 (1991).
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the natural and original state. The ideal, represented by Adam and
Eve before their downfall, depicts nudity as acceptable and virtual-
ly unnoticed-the norm rather than the exception. 67
The women appealed the conviction to the Monroe County
Court. Although Judge Connell had upheld the statute in the first
case,' Judge Patricia D. Marks, in ruling on the appeal from the
second convictions, held section 245.01 to be unconstitutional. She
concluded that
[m]ale and female breasts are physiologically similar except for
lactation capability. Therefore, it is apparent that the [New York]
Law with the gender based classification does not serve the legiti-
mate governmental interest better than would a gender neutral
law.
The Court therefore concludes that the statute's gender
classification violates the equal protection clauses of the [United
States] and [New York State] Constitutions. 69
Accordingly, Judge Marks dismissed the women's second convic-
tions on equal protection grounds.70
C. People v. Santorelli: Majority Opinion
The women's first conviction eventually reached the New
York Court of Appeals.71 In a memorandum decision, the court
dismissed the convictions by interpreting the statute to apply only
to lewd activity, not to topless sunbathing, although the legislative
history of the statute indicates otherwise. 72 Relying on the maxim
that a statute should enjoy a "presumption of constitutionality,"
the majority did not address the women's equal protection argu-
ment.73 Thus, the opinion is disingenuous; the court's legal analy-
sis evades clearly implicated gender issues.
67. For feminist analyses of biblical texts, see CAROL L. MEYERS, DISCOVERING
EVE: ANCIENT ISRAELITE WOMEN IN CONTEXT (1988); PHYLIs TRIBLE, TEXTS OF TER-
RoR: LrrERARY-FEMINIST READINGS OF BIBLICAL NARRATIVES (1984).
68. People v. Craft, 564 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Monroe County Ct. 1991), rev'd sub nom.
People v. Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d 232 (N.Y. 1992).
69. People v. David, 585 N.Y.S.2d 149, 151 (Monroe County Ct. 1991) (footnotes
omitted).
70. Id. at 152.
71. People v. Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d 232 (N.Y. 1992).
72. See supra Section I(A).
73. Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d at 233.
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In failing to "challenge patterns of thought,"'74 the majority
of the court fell victim to "judicial passivity." Instead of confront-
ing the concededly difficult issues of equality and social norms, the
court rested its decision on a fabrication of statutory construction.
The court did not, as Martha Minow suggests they should have,
"consider the human consequences of their decisions."'75 The judg-
es could have relied on their own personal experiences to appreci-
ate fully the recognition these appellants were seeking. A male
judge may take for granted his unfettered right to toss off his shirt
whenever and for whatever reason he likes-because he's hot,
wants to swim, or wants to show off the benefits of his exercise
regimen. By being confronted with his own experience and made
consciously aware of the choices he is able to make, a male judge
could become more accepting of a particular female litigant's
needs and experiences. A male judge who is able to make that
leap is better able to see exactly how unequal the position of men
and women is and the double standard that this statute imple-
76ments.
D. Recognizing the Gender Issue
As the Santorelli concurrence correctly acknowledges, this case
demands the equal protection analysis that the majority ignored.7
New York Penal Law section 245.01 requires women, but not men,
to cover their breasts in public. The law treats men and women
differently.
Discrimination between men and women violates the Equal
Protection Clause unless the government's classification is "sub-
stantially related to the achievement of [an important government]
objective[]."' Because gender classifications are "inherently sus-
74. Minow, supra note 31, at 86.
75. Id. at 89.
76. Robin West has suggested that judges need to "look past our differences and un-
derstand the suffering of others by reference to our shared human aspirations, fears,
pains, and pleasures. The ability to look past difference to the humanity that we share is
necessary to any sensibly evolving notion of constitutional entitlement ... ." Robin L.
West, Taking Preferences Seriously, 64 TUL L. REV. 659, 703 (1990).
77. Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d at 234 (Titone, J., concurring).
78. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); see also Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388 (1972); Peo-
ple v. Liberta, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207, 216-218 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020 (1985).
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pect," '79 the government has the burden of establishing a substan-
tial relationship between a statute that discriminates on the basis
of gender and a legitimate government objective.' In essence, the
State must demonstrate that a gender-based statute achieves the
legitimate goal better than a gender-neutral statute could."'
In Santorelli, the prosecutors did not even bother to articulate
an objective for using a gender distinction in section 245.01Y
Nonetheless, it is clear from legislative history that "the govern-
mental objective ... is to protect the sensibilities of those who
wish to use the public beaches and parks. 813 The State, however,
offered no evidence to show that a woman's chest causes greater
public harm than a man's does. This assumption-that women's
breasts are offensive in a way that men's breasts are
not-underlies the statute. Undoubtedly, it reflects a traditional
view of the female body, but assumptions and stereotypes are not
enough to justify discrimination:
Although protecting public sensibilities is a generally legiti-
mate goal for legislation, it is a tenuous basis for justifying a
legislative classification that is based on gender, race or any other
grouping that is associated with a history of social prejudice.
Indeed, the concept of "public sensibility" itself, when used in
these contexts, may be nothing more than a reflection of com-
monly held preconceptions and biases. One of the most impor-
tant purposes to be served by the Equal Protection Clause is to
ensure that "public sensibilities" grounded in prejudice and unex-
amined stereotypes do not become enshrined as part of the offi-
cial policy of government. Thus, where "public sensibilities" con-
stitute the justification for a gender-based classification, the fun-
damental question is whether the particular "sensibility" to be
protected is, in fact, a reflection of archaic prejudice or a mani-
festation of a legitimate government objective.8
The role of public sensibilities as a basis for discriminatory legisla-
tion and practices has been delegitimized in other contexts. For
79. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973).
80. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
81. Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins., 446 U.S. 142, 151-52 (1980); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S.
268, 281-83 (1979).
82. People v. Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d 232, 236 (N.Y. 1992) (Titone, J., concurring).
83. Id.
84. Id. (citations omitted).
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example, in Palmore v. Sidoti,8s the U.S. Supreme Court held on
equal protection grounds that offense to public sensibilities and
potential societal stigmatization were not sufficient to terminate a
mother's custody rights merely because she was romantically in-
volved with a man of a different race.' However, the notion per-
sists that society must be protected from the evils women and
female sexuality pose. Characteristics that are more gender-neutral
and more universally regarded as offensive, such as body odor, are
neither statutorily regulated nor criminalized based on the mere
effect the characteristic might have on potential viewers (or smell-
ers).
Other than societal presuppositions, there is no inherent rea-
son why exposure of the female breast is any more offensive than
exposure of the male breast. Other Western societies do not share
this assumption; in fact, topless sunbathing is common in Eu-
rope.' A clash of cultural views on the nudity issue is currently
being played out in Germany. Most former East Germans were
brought up with nude beaches; whole families sunbathed naked on
the beach. Since German reunification, complete nudity has not
been as accepted because many West Germans oppose it. Yet,
even the relatively "prudish" West Germans do not object to
toplessness; their only concern is exposure of genitals in public.'
Canada is in the midst of ongoing bare-breast protests, and
Canada's Supreme Court may soon hear an argument for chest
equality under the Canadian Charter.of Rights and Freedoms. 9
85. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
86. Id. Chief Justice Burger wrote:
There is a risk that a child living with a stepparent of a different race may be
subject to a variety of pressures and stresses not present if the child were living
with parents of the same racial or ethnic origin.
The question, however, is whether the reality of private biases and the
possible injury they might inflict are permissible considerations for removal of
an infant child from the custody of its natural mother. We have little difficulty
concluding that they are not. The Constitution cannot control such prejudices
but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the
law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.
Id. at 433 (footnote omitted).
87. Emily Campbell, Obscenity, Music and the First Amendment: Was the Crew 2
Lively?, 15 NOVA L. REv. 159, 199 n.209 (1991).
88. Kara Swisher, Eastern Nudes vs. Western Prudes: Unified Germany Divided Over
Birthday Suits at the Beach, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1992, at D1 (suggesting that a serious
consequence of unity and the new taboo surrounding nude sunbathing has been an in-
crease in pornography in eastern Germany).
89. Anna-Liza Kozma, Her Say: Breast Emancipation May Be a Setback, CHl. TRI-
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Anatomically, men's and women's breasts are fairly similar,
which suggests that the law should treat the two similarly. Dr. Jack
Morin has concluded that "[p]hysiologically, men's and women's
breasts have the same erotic potential, with virtually identical
anatomy, except that women's breasts are obviously more devel-
oped. Similarities include a rich supply of nerve endings, especially
within the nipple and surrounding areola. In addition, the nipples
in both sexes have erectile capacity. '
One underlying argument for distinguishing between male and
female breasts is that they are sexually stimulating to differing
degrees. It seems obvious, and it has been borne out in research,
that men find women's breasts sexually stimulating.9' Therefore,
the argument goes, women's breasts should not be exposed in
public. A basic problem with this argument is that researchers
have also found that the chest is the male body part most sexually
stimulating to women.' Carrying the argument to its logical con-
clusion, men's chests should not be exposed because they stimulate
women. Neither physiological distinctions nor the visual stimuli of
female breasts support a rationale for gender-specific exposure
statutes. Because men and women are similarly situated in this
regard, a gender-neutral statute, if any, is appropriate.
II. A JURISDICrIONAL COMPARISON
A. Statutory Treatment of Exposure
The fact that forty-eight other states have not criminalized the
mere exposure of a woman's breasts severely weakens the asserted
rationale for gender classification in New York Penal Law section
245.01: that the public must be protected from the great evil that
the exposed female breast poses.93 New York and Indiana are the
only two states that have laws prohibiting the mere exposure of
women's breasts.94
BUNE, Sept. 20, 1992, at 13.
90. Jack Morin, Male Breast: Overlooked Erogenous Zone, 20 MEDIcAL AsPECTS OF
HUMAN SEXUALITY 85, 128 (1986).
91. Women's breasts are sexually stimulating to (heterosexual) men, at least in part
because they are publicly inaccessible; society further eroticizes the female breast by tag-
ging it shameful to expose. See WOLF, supra note 15, at 152.
92. Robert Wildman et al., Note on Males' and Females' Preferences For Opposite-Sex
Body Parts, Bust Sizes, and Bust-Revealing Clothing, 38 PSYCHOL REP. 485-86 (1976).
93. See discussion supra Section I(D).
94. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45--4-1 (Burns 1985); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.01
[Vol. 43:113
19931 WOMEN'S BODY IMAGE 131
The overwhelming majority of states restrict penalties for
public exposure to "lewd"' acts or to exposure of the genita-
lia.6 Approximately twenty states specifically restrict their public
exposure laws to genitalia. 7 Of these, only New Mexico prohibits
mere exposure of the genitalia without lewd intent." Other state
statutes require the actor to have been reckless, to have had the
intent of causing affront or alarm, or to have had the purpose of
arousing or gratifying sexual desire."
There is additional evidence that exposure statutes generally
are not concerned with the female breast. Wisconsin's statute,
which formerly prohibited exposure of the "sex organ," now uses
the more precise terms "genitals" and "pubic area."' ° West Vir-
ginia restricts liability to exposure of the "sex organs" or
"anus,"'10 1 and the Tennessee statute penalizes only exposure of
the "genitals" or "buttocks.'1°2 Even statutes that use the more
ambiguous "private parts" or "sex organs" language prohibit only
acts done with some intent to create offense or alarm.10 3 Some-
thing more than mere exposure is required to criminalize the ac-
tion.
(McKinney 1989).
95. "Lewd" is defined as "1. inclined to, characterized by, or inciting to lust or lech-
ery, lascivious. 2. obscene or indecent . . . . 3. a. low, ignorant, or vulgar. b. base, vile,
or wicked . . . . c. bad, worthless, or poor." THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1106 (2d ed. 1987).
96. "Genitalia" is defined as "the organs of reproduction." Id. at 797.
97. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.460 (1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-302 (1986); IDAHO
CODE § 18-4105 (1987); IOWA CODE § 709.9 (1979); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.150
(Baldwin 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A § 854 (West 1983 & 1992 Supp.); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 566.130 (Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-504 (1989); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28.806 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:1 (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
30-9-14 (Michie 1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-12.1 (1985) (includes anus); OR.
REV. STAT. § 163.465 (1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-45-1 (1981 & 1992 Supp.); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-24-1 (1988 & 1993 Supp.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-511
(1991) (includes buttocks); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.08 (West 1989) (includes anus);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-702 (1990); Wis. STAT. § 944.20 (1982 & 1992 Supp.).
98. N.M. STAT ANN. § 30-9-14 (Michie 1984).
99. See, eg., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.150(1) ("A person is guilty of indecent
exposure when he intentionally exposes his genitals under circumstances in which he
knows or should know his conduct is likely to cause affront or alarm.").
100. Wis. STAT. § 944.20.
101. W. VA. CODE § 61-8-9 (1992).
102. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-511.
103. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-12-130 (1982) (requiring knowledge that the lewd
act "is likely to be observed by others who would be affronted or alarmed").
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Other than Indiana and New York,"° only a few states spe-
.cifically prohibit women from exposing their breasts. These prohi-
bitions, however, are generally coupled with a requirement that
the actor intend to arouse sexual desire 05 or know that the con-
duct will cause alarm.1°6
B. Judicial Interpretations and Applications of Exposure Laws
The statutory isolation of New York and Indiana is height-
ened by a number of state court decisions that have explicitly held
that a breast is not a "private part" and that breast exposure is
not lewd in and of itself." Such judicial interpretations arise
mainly in states whose exposure statutes use ambiguous terminolo-
gy. For example, California and North Carolina prohibit the public
exposure of "private parts.""t In State v. Jones,"° the North
Carolina Court of Appeals interpreted "private parts" as "general-
ly acceptable legal parlance in referring to male or female genita-
lia."' 0 Hence, the court held that female breasts are not private
parts and that the statute did not prohibit breast exposure." An
Ohio court, relying on Jones, also concluded that a breast is not a
"private part." ' Similarly, a California court held that its state's
applicable penal section does not encompass breast exposure.1
Florida's equally imprecise statutory term, ."sexual organs,""' has
also been interpreted to exclude breasts, unless they are exposed
in a lewd or lascivious manner.1 5
In State v. Crenshaw,"6 the Supreme Court of Hawaii held
that wearing only bikini bottoms while sunbathing on a public
beach did not constitute a lewd act within the meaning of the
104. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-4-1 (Bums 1985) (prohibiting mere exposure of a
woman's breast); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.01 (McKinney 1989) (same).
105. WYO. STAT. § 6-4-201 (1988).
106. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 764 (1992 Supp.).
107. See, eg., State v. Crenshaw, 597 P.2d 13, 14 (Haw. 1979); State v. Jones, 171
S.E.2d 468 (N.C. Ct. App. 1970).
108. CAL. PENAL CODE § 314 (West 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.9 (1986).
109. 171 S.E.2d 468 (N.C. Ct. App. 1970).
110. ld. at 469.
111. IiL at 470.
112. State v. Parenteau, 564 N.E.2d 505, 506 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1990).
113. Robbins v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. Rptr. 853, 859-60 (Cal. Ct. App.
1967).
114. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.03 (West 1992).
115. Duvallon v. State, 404 So. 2d 196, 197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
116. 597 P.2d 13 (Haw. 1979).
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Hawaii statute." The court reasoned that because female breasts
are not genitalia, exposure of the breast is not a "lewd act."11
In State v. Bull, a case decided the same day as Crenshaw, the
court upheld the convictions of completely nude male and female
sunbathers but reversed the convictions of two defendants who
were body surfing and swimming in the nude because there was
not enough evidence that these defendants were likely to expose
their genitalia to public view.' Taken together, Crenshaw and
Bull make it clear that the Hawaii Supreme Court did not dis-
pense with the state's exposure laws but distinguished between
private parts and breasts. In essence, the court defined nudity so
as to exclude breasts.
Even in circumstances not related to public exposure, courts
have held that breasts are not private parts. The Supreme Court
of Oregon held that a defendant charged with contributing to the
delinquency of a child for fondling and manipulating the victim's
private parts could not be convicted solely on evidence that he
played with her breasts because the term "private parts" refers to
genital organs and not breasts. 121 A Canadian court reached a
similar conclusion in 1984, finding a man not guilty of sexual as-
sault for fondling a woman's breast because, according to
Webster's Dictionary, breasts are not "primary sexual characteris-
tics."" The unfortunate outcome of these cases could easily be
rectified by changing statutes to specifically cover nonconsensual
fondling of the breasts (or any other body part for that matter) of
either women or men. This change requires only that legislatures
be more precise in their use of terminology and avoid vague lan-
guage such as "private parts" and "sex organs."
117. ld. at 14. The Hawaii statute states that, "A person commits the offense of open
lewdness if in a public place he does any lewd act which is likely to be observed by
others who would be affronted or alarmed." HAW. REV. STAT. § 712-1217(1) (1988).
118. Crenshaw, 597 P.2d at 14.
119. 597 P.2d 10 (Haw. 1979).
120. I& at 13.
121. State v. Moore, 241 P.2d 455, 459 (Or. 1952).
122. See Kozma, supra note 89, at 13.
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C. A Precursor to People v. Santorelli and the Problem of Point
of View
Although only two states force women to conceal their breasts
in public, many municipalities have passed local ordinances to the
same effect. Faced with facts similar to People v. Santorelli, the
Supreme Court of Washington, in City of Seattle v. Buchanan,1
upheld a Seattle city ordinance prohibiting women from publicly
exposing their breasts.124 In Buchanan, five women were arrested
at the Seattle Arboretum for swimming, sunbathing, and playing
frisbee with their breasts exposed.1 25 They were fined $100 each
for violating the ordinance. 26 The women appealed.
Experts testified at trial that there is no significant difference
between male and female breasts. 27 The court, however, chose
not to believe the medical and scientific evidence and instead re-
lied on lay newspaper articles. 28 It concluded that female
123. 584 P.2d 918 (Wash. 1978).
124. Id. at 930. The ordinance in question prohibited "lewd conduct:"
(1) As used in this section a 'lewd act' is:
(a) an exposure of one's genitals or female breasts;
(b) the touching, caressing or fondling of the genitals or female breasts; or
(c) sexual intercourse as defined in Section 12A.04.140(1)(c); or
(d) masturbation; or
(e) urination or defecation in a place other than a washroom or toilet room.
(2) A person is guilty of lewd conduct if he intentionally performs any
lewd act in a public place or at a place and under circumstances where such
act could be observed by any member of the public.
(a) 'Public place' has the meaning defined in section 12A.12.020(1)(a).
(3) The owner, manager or operator of premises open to the public
wherein alcoholic beverages are sold, served or consumed is guilty of permitting
lewd conduct if he intentionally permits or causes any lewd act on said premis-
es.
(4) This section shall not be applied to artistic or dramatic performances
in a theatre or a museum.
Id. at 920 n.3 (quoting Seattle, Wash., ordinance 102843, § 12A.12.150).
125. Id. at 919.
126. Id.
127. The court noted the testimony of one expert who stated
that there is no difference in the composition of the flesh of male and female
breasts; that the breasts do not form a primary sex characteristic but a second-
ary one, and that the degree of development of the breasts does not determine
sex . . .. [S]ome men have breasts as large as those of some small-breasted
women.
Id. at 919 (footnote omitted).
128. As evidence of the overwhelming danger of exposed female breasts, the court
used the following two excerpts from the Seattle-Post Intelligencer
The Big eyeballing attraction during the hydro races-which even diverted
some attention from the Blue Angels-was a ainghy carrying four topless
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breasts,, but not male breasts, "constitute an errogenous [sic]
zone."
l 9
The court's focus was exclusively on the male point of
view-the reaction of male observers to female breasts. The differ-
entiation between male and female breasts was not based on phys-
iology but on external reactions. Indeed, the only substantial dis-
tinction the court found between male and female breasts was
male sexual arousal at women's breasts. "[T]he preservation of
public decency and order"' "3° is achieved by limiting women's
freedom because exposure by women presumably inspires uncon-
trollable urges in males. This framework of protecting women from
men shifts the burden of responsibility from men to women; be-
cause women provoke uncontrollable urges in males, society excus-
es male behavior and blames the victim for whatever happens."'
Yet "[m]en are not 'wild animals' and women are not their 'tam-
ers.' ,32 In many ways, the excitement for men in viewing wom-
en bare-breasted is rooted in the prohibition against public expo-
sure. This element of the forbidden merely perpetuates the intense
male reaction female exposure allegedly inspires.
girls-propelled mostly, it seemed, by the hot breath of male onlookers.
An Atlanta, Ga., ordinance requires shops to draw their blinds when the
cloth[e]s on female window dummies are being changed. Understand it was
passed as a result of a few traffic accidents.
Id. at 920 n.4 (quoting Emmett Watson, SEATrLE PosT INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 9, 1977, §
B, at 1 and SEATrLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 10, 1977, § B, at 5).
129. Id. at 920. But see Morin, supra note 90.
130. Buchanan, 584 P.2d at 922.
131. See Joan H. Aiken, Differentiating Sex From Sex.: The Male Irresistible Impulse,
12 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 357, 380 (1983) (noting that to sanction the concept
that men have uncontrollable urges implies that violence against women is inevitable)
(citation omitted).
Women have to walk a fine line between being too pretty-jurors might think she
invited the rape or sexual harassment-and being not pretty enough-jurors would think,
"Who'd rape her?" Carol Sanger, The Reasonable Woman and the Ordinary Man, 65 S.
CAL L. REV. 1411, 1413 (1992). Women's body image cannot help but be negatively
affected when a jury acquits a defendant accused of rape because "we felt she [the wom-
an] asked for it for the way she was dressed .... with that skirt, you could see every-
thing she had. She was advertising for sex." Jury: Woman in Rape Case 'Asked for 1'
CHi. TRIBUNE, Oct. 6, 1989, at 11; see Peter M. Hazelton, Note, Rape Shield Laws: Lim-
its on Zealous Advocacy, 19 AM. J. CRIM. L. 35, 35 (1991). Given such reactions, women
are made to feel self-conscious about everything they wear.
132. Aiken, supra note 131, at 381.
133. See Whisner, supra note 25, at 117.
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As Mary Whisner has explained, women are missing from the
Buchanan court's analysis.TM The court paid no attention to the
women's mind-set, motives, or intentions. The women's desire to
and enjoyment of going topless was not even considered; their
interest was considered only as it related to male viewers. More-
over, what the court considered to be sexually arousing was
viewed only from the (heterosexual) male point of view. Either
the court was under the mistaken impression that women are not
aroused by male chests, 35 or it desired, consciously -or subcon-
sciously, to reinforce stereotypes of women as passive sexual be-
ings who even when "aroused ... would not react so as to disturb
the public order."' 36
Whisner is also critical of the court's definition of "lewd." 137
The majority used a dictionary definition of lewd-"suggestive of
or tending to moral looseness: inciting to sensual desire or imagi-
nation"--that defined the term solely from the viewer's per-
spective. Because (heterosexual) male viewers could be aroused by
the sight of female breasts, women are guilty. As Justice Utter ac-
knowledged in his dissent, these women will have a criminal re-
cord, although they had no "intent to excite a sexual response in
the beholder., 139
The Santorelli court does not adopt this paternalistic way of
thinking completely. By allowing women in New York to sunbathe
topless, the court empowers women at least to some degree. Of
course, this is not a perfect world. The Santorelli appellants know
that women who go topless may encounter some disagreeable
reactions. Topless sunbathing is probably not something most
women want to do because undoubtedly. some people will stare,
leer, or make unpleasant comments. Yet adult women who choose
to take off their tops in public must be willing to take responsibili-
ty for their actions and accept some of the unpleasantries that may
result. Women are not asking to be protected; they simply want to
be able to choose how to enjoy themselves and to reclaim control
of their bodies.
134. Id. at 113.
135. See Wildman et al., supra note 92, at 485.
136. Whisner, supra note 25, at 113.
137. Id. at 113-14.
138. City of Seattle v. Buchanan, 584 P.2d 918, 929 (Wash. 1978).
139. Id. at 931 (Utter, J., dissenting).
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III. THE BROADER RELEVANCE OF PEOPLE V. SANTORELLI
A. Practical Implications of the Mandatory Covering of Women's
Breasts
Women have suffered physically and psychologically as a
result of the negative messages they receive about their bodies.
These consequences also affect women's relationships with men,
other women, and their children. Any real and complete indepen-
dence and equality that women achieve must be accompanied by
autonomy over their own bodies.
1. Unnecessary Cosmetic Surgery. Women have been driven
to self-destructive surgical procedures because they are not encour-
aged and do not learn to be proud and accepting of who they are
as women."4 Women's pervasive dissatisfaction with their bodies
has culminated in massive numbers of women seeking breast re-
ductions or implants.14' A total of two million American women,
or 150,000 a year, have received breast implants; 42 more than
eighty percent of these women had the surgery for purely cosmetic
reasons. 4 Not surprisingly, the implant industry has grown into
a $500 million-a-year business.'" Some women have this surgery
for themselves; others receive breast implants as gifts from hus-
bands or boyfriends who even pick out the breast size they
want. 4
Cosmetic surgery, like any form of surgery, involves risks. This
type of breast surgery leads to a hardening of the scar tissue
around the implants, which makes breast cancer harder to detect
and can cause a lack of sensation in and hardening of the breast.
Some implants tend to leak or rupture and require periodic re-
placement."4 Silicone breast implants also can cause other prob-
140. See infra subsection III(A)(4) (discussing how women could benefit from more
communal female nude experiences).
141. Men are far less likely to have invasive procedures and more likely to change
their appearances through exercise and weight regimens. According to the American Soci-
ety of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons, fewer than 200 men had pectoral implants in
1990. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Her Image of His Ideal, in a Faulty Mirror, N.Y. TIMES, July
22, 1992, at C12.
142. Laura Shapiro et al., What Is It with Women and Breasts?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 20,
1992, at 57.
143. Id.
144. Barbara Ehrenreich, Stamping out a Dread Scourge, TIME, Feb. 17, 1992, at 88.
145. Shapiro et al., supra note 142, at 57.
146. Philip J. Hilts, Vigilance Is Called Essential for Women with Implants, N.Y.
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lems: chest pain; arthritis-like diseases that cause pain and swelling
of the joints; scleroderma, a skin disease that leads to toughness,
redness, or swelling of the extremities; autoimmune disorders;
swelling of the lymph nodes and nodes under the arm; and stiff-
ness in the chest, shoulder, and upper arm.147
In January 1992, the Food and Drug Administration imposed
a moratorium on gel implants that effectively amounted to a ban
on their use. Until new safety studies are performed, the implants
will be immediately available only to women who are enrolled in
clinical trials or who meet an "urgent need" exception. This excep-
tion is primarily for cancer patients who have had mastectomies
and allows these women to receive silicone-gel implants without
being enrolled in a long-term clinical trial."4
Several thousand lawsuits have been filed by women claiming
they have been harmed by silicone breast implants. About 400
federal cases have been joined together, and a decision on whether
a class action should go forward is pending. 149
2. Breast-Feeding. Requiring women to cover their breasts
in public also has discouraged women from breast-feeding.150
This concern is the reason one of the Santorelli appellants, Mary
Lou Schloss, gave for her involvement in the topless. demonstra-
tion. She had been active in childbirth education and "felt that
helping to remove a law that puts any kind of restrictions on
breast exposure would help women feel more comfortable with the
idea of breast-feeding in our society." ' The exposure of
women's breasts has become so taboo in this culture that women
do not feel comfortable using them for the very reason they are
different from men's-lactation. 52
TIMES, Jan. 8, 1992, at A16.
147. Felicity Barringer, First Steps Taken in Revived Use of Breast Implants, N.Y.
TIMES, May 3, 1992, at A34; Hilts, supra note 146, at A16.
148. Barringer, supra note 147, at A34.
149. Philip J. Hilts, Decision Time Near for Implant Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1992,
at C12.
150. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 27, People v. Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d 232 (N.Y.
1992) (No. 115) (referencing testimony of psychologist Dr. Rita Freedman).
151. Id, at 6 (quoting trial transcript in the Rochester City Court).
Our society is far more at home with the idea of sexy breasts than functional
ones. Even a woman who is comfortable with the mechanics of nursing may
feel ill at ease in public-subject to stares or pointedly averted eyes, and know-
ing that she make[s] many people around them uncomfortable.
Lisa deMauro, Beating the Bottle, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1991, at A21.
152. A related problem, recounted by Dr. Freedman, is that women tend to avoid
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Breast-feeding is a vivid example of the inequities in the pow-
er structure. A male norm focuses the difference as resting with
women. Because men cannot breast-feed, it is not accepted as a
form of appropriate public behavior. Christine Littleton describes
the following scenario:
Consider the woman who recently lunched in the restaurant of
the Beverly Rodeo Hotel. When she began breastfeeding her
infant the manager asked her to leave the dining room. What
routes are open to her? Imagine the following dialogue:
Woman: Equality!
Restaurant: Yes, let's have equality. We don't allow men to bare
their breasts in the dining room, so we can't let you do it either.
(Assumption of symmetry.)
Woman: Wait a minute. There's a difference between those two
situations.
Restaurant: Yes, there's a difference. Women's breasts are far
more disruptive than men's breasts. Keep yours covered. (Loca-
tion of difference in the woman.)
Woman: No, I have different needs and this social institution
should take account of them.
Restaurant: Fine, go over there behind the screen. You can re-
join the others when you're finished. ("Accommodation" of dif-
ference leaves institution itself as rejecting the woman.)...
Men are not made to feel different because they do not breast-
feed; women, however, are made to feel different and uncomfort-
able because they do breast-feed.
Breast-feeding serves a vital purpose. The connection between
mother and infant is critical; male observers are irrelevant to the
process. By viewing the situation from the male perspective, soci-
breast examinations because of their specific discomfort with that part of their bodies.
Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 27 n.14, People v. Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d 232 (N.Y.
1992) (No. 115) (referencing testimony of psychologist Dr. Rita Freedman). Breast cancer
is a serious and growing concern for American women. According to the American Can-
cer Society, 1 in 9 women will be diagnosed with breast cancer each year, a dramatic in-
crease from the 1 in 20 women who got the disease in 1940. Jeanne Kassler, Weighing
Lumpectomies vs. Mastectomies, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1991, at 12LI8. Each year alone,
breast cancer will strike 150,000 women and claim 45,000 lives. Jane E. Brody, Personal
Health, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1990, at B5; Marian Burros, Eating Well, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
12, 1992, at C4. Breast examination is critical for early detection; the cure rate for wom-
en whose cancer has not spread is virtually 100%. Brody, supra; Elisabeth Rosenthal,
Screening the Tests That Detect Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1991, § 6, at 9.
153. Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL L. REv. 1279,
1310-11 (1987) (footnote omitted).
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ety continually places breast-feeding mothers in uncomfortable
situations and perpetually reminds them of their "otherness.
' 'd u
This" discomfort can be severe enough to deter women from mak-
ing the choice to breast-feed although breast-feeding is generally
considered to be preferable to other methods of feeding an in-
fant."s
3. Good Girls/Bad Girls. The New York law at issue in
Santorelli also reinforces a damaging double standard between
women. It exempts women who appear topless for the entertain-
ment of others. 6 However, women who want to go topless for
their own enjoyment are not allowed to take off their shirts.
Maintaining this'inequality reinforces a dual image of women:
"good girls" vs. "bad girls;" "Madonnas" vs. "whores.''1
Both of these images serve to oppress women. "Good girls"
are denied freedom in areas related to sexuality, whereas the law
legitimizes the exploitation of "bad girls." ' Frances Olsen has
explained this double standard for women's sexuality:
First, nonmarital sex, or sexual activity separated from emotional
commitment, is considered desirable for men but devaluing for
women. The second aspect is a corollary of the first: some wom-
en have to be "immoral" in order to serve as sexual partners for
males outside of marriage. Thus, women are categorized as moral
or immoral, good girls or bad girls, virgins or whores, wife mate-
rial or playmate material. 59
154. Because a patriarchal society uses the male as the standard, women are made to
feel like outcasts because they do something-brcast-feed-that men do not do. Men, in
contrast, are not made to feel inferior because of their inability to breast-feed. Cf. id. at
1311 & n.171 (drawing a parallel between the significance women place on breast-feeding
and the significance observant Jews place on kosher food, in that the ubiquity of non-
kosher foods in American cuisine sends a similar signal of "otherness").
155. According to the U.S. Surgeon General and the American Academy of Pediatrics,
breast milk is the best form of nutrition for babies. Breast milk has all the essential
nutrients, and its content varies to meet the baby's changing nutritional needs. It is the
only mechanism for passing on immunity after birth, and it is far less likely than formula
to cause allergic reactions or constipation. deMauro, supra note 151, at A21.
In part because of the health benefits associated with breast-feeding, Florida recent-
ly enacted the first state statute guaranteeing women the right to breast-feed in public.
See Larry Rohter, Florida Approves Measure on Right to Breast-Feed in Public, N.Y.
TIMEs, March 4, 1993, at A18.
156. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.01 (McKinney 1989).
157. See Willis, supra note 8, at 38.
158. Frances Olsen, Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARV. L. REV. 105, 110 n.24 (1989).
159. Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L.
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"Good girls" need to be protected and cannot make decisions for
themselves. Exemptions are made to allow "bad girls" to service
male needs, but women are inhibited from acting in their own self-
interest. Collapsing this dualism is an important step in gaining
respect for individual women's choices.
4. Psychological Isolation of Women and the Benefits of
Women Encountering Others Nude. In the United States, women
rarely see other women naked.' 6° Such exposure only Occurs with
any regularity in the movies, and actresses rarely embody the
average female form. 1 Women have, in effect, been kept ig-
norant about the realities of their own bodies.
Because men are able to see what shapes and sizes other men
come in, they are better able to understand that their own body
shapes are just one of many acceptable variations. Women, howev-
er, *have no similar "locker room experience." The only other
naked female forms they are allowed to see are cover girls and
Barbie dolls. This isolation has been very effective in conditioning
women to believe that the cover girl is the only acceptable body
image for women. 62 Women have willingly lined up at plastic
surgeons' offices because they have been conditioned to believe
that breasts only come in one acceptable form;163 if their breasts
do not fit this model, something is wrong with the way they, as
women, appear. Women are kept from realizing that "breasts
come in as many shapes and variations as there are women. '' 1
Professor Carlin Meyer acknowledges that until she was twenty-
one years old, she did not realize that her breasts were nothing to
be ashamed of because they did not look like Barbie's. She came
to this realization only after joining a group of bare-chested swim-
mers, among whom she was able to see and appreciate the variety
of the female form. She maintains that
if a few real... bosoms are bared, more young women and men
will notice that breasts are not as toy manufacturers, filmmakers,
REV. 387, 402 n.70 (1984).
160. WOLF, supra note 15, at 136.
161. Men also only see "perfect" women as they are portrayed by the media and thus
may make their wives or girlfriends feel inferior.
162. Shapiro et al., supra note 142, at 57.
163. See supra subsection III(A)(1).
164. WOLF, supra note 15, at 247.
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pornographers and novelists portray them. Maybe girls would be
less ashamed of them and wouldn't feel the need to wear "fals-
ies" or to ask physicians to enlarge them with injurious synthet-
ics.165
Although suggesting a re-thinking of female communal nudity
sounds radical, many women have described in revelatory terms
what such group experiences have meant for them. Deirdre Eng-
lish describes such an experience:
It was a hot summer day in Pennsylvania, and during a break in
the weekend-long conference we gathered at an outdoor
swimming pool. There were no men around, so we all stripped
and swam naked-dozens of women, most of them perfect
strangers. I had never really been struck before by how different
women's bodies are from how they're "supposed to be," and how
[a] woman's body is unique. The effect was incredibly beauti-
ful. 166
It is important for women to learn to love their bodies. Such
affinity will lead to more autonomy and strength for women, as
well as to a lessening of male control over them. 67 A more posi-
tive approach to female nudity would help combat the problems
women have with body image.68
B. Other Legal Contexts That Have Had an Impact on Women's
Body Image
Public exposure laws are only one example of the law's signif-
icant effect on the way women think and feel about their bodies.
Their enforcement is a poignant example of how the law is used
to subordinate women and a dramatic illustration of the different
positions men and women occupy in our society. Yet topless sun-
bathing is not an isolated instance in which the law has a negative
influence on women's body image.
165. Meyer, supra note 8, at A21.
166. Deirdre English, The Politics of Porn: Can Feminists Walk The Line?, MOTHER
JoNEs, April 1980, at 20, 50.
167. ROSEMARIE TONG, WOMEN, SEX, AND THE LAW 32 (1984).
168. Women with eating disorders such as anorexia and bulimia could be helped by
viewing other real women. Indeed, if women, from an early age, saw other women's
bodies, these disorders might even be prevented. See WOLF, supra note 15, at 280.
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1. Television Anchorwomen. The case of Craft
v. Metromedia, Inc."s illustrates the impact that employment
discrimination law can have on women's body image. Christine
Craft alleged that her treatment while employed as a co-anchor of
the nightly news in Kansas City and her subsequent demotion con-
stituted sex discrimination. 70 She contended that appearance
standards imposed on her were much more stringent than those
imposed on male anchors. 7' She was subjected to extensive
makeup counseling and a "clothing calendar" to ensure that she
did not wear the same outfit more often than once every three
weeks.' Eventually, she was reassigned from the co-anchor posi-
tion to general reporting duties because Metromedia allegedly con-
sidered her "too old, too unattractive, and not deferential enough
to men."" At trial, a jury found that Craft had been a victim of
sex discrimination and rendered a verdict in her favor.174 The tri-
al court, however, set aside the jury's verdict.75 The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court
that Craft had not been subject to sex discrimination, in essence
ruling that she could be fired from her job because she was not
sufficiently attractive.76
A case such as Craft, involving a high-profile plaintiff, sends a
strong message to women. It is no wonder that a large part of
women's self-worth revolves around their appearance: their careers
could be at stake. In addition to concerns about job performance,
women bear the additional burden of being beautiful. Not only
must women expend time and energy maintaining these appear-
ance standards, but the law allows employers to treat any lack of
beauty as the woman's fault, for which she can lose her job. It is
her fault if she is brunette in a blonde world, or if she wrinkles in
169. 572 F. Supp. 868 (W.D. Mo. 1983), affd in part and rev'd in part, 766 F.2d 1205
(8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1058 (1986).
170. Id. at 876.
171. Craft, 766 F.2d at 1210.
172. Id. at 1209, 1214.
173. Craft, 572 F. Supp. at 878.
174. Id. at 870.
175. ld. at 877-79.
176. Craft, 766 F.2d at 1215-17. For analysis of the Title VII issues involved in Craft,
see Patti Buchman, Title VII Limits on Discrimination Against Television Anchorwomen
on the Basis of Age-Related Appearance, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 190 (1985); Leslie S.
Gielow, Note, Sex Discrimination in Newscasting, 84 MICH. L. REv. 443 (1985).
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a world that does not allow aging."7 What a powerful force the
law would be if, instead, it did not condone such thinking but
allowed individuals to come in all shapes, sizes, and colors, to
grow old gracefully and honorably, and to perform their jobs pro-
fessionally whatever their appearance.
2. Flight Attendant Weight and Makeup Policies. Airlines
have a history of employing young, attractive women as marketing
ploys to attract male passengers.' 78 Litigation battles continue
over airline maximum weight limits that are often set at levels that
only serve to perpetuate stereotypical notions of female attractive-
ness and often pose dangerous health risks. Unnecessarily low or
stringent weight restrictions serve no legitimate safety purpose.
Instead, because there are no allowances for weight gain with age,
these restrictions allow the airlines to terminate older flight atten-
dants and to maintain a demoralizing control over their
workforce."7
In several early cases, courts upheld airline weight restric-
tions,"s but in 1982, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that -Continental Airline's weight maximums violated
Title VII181 In 1987, Pan American settled a class action suit in
177. Ellen Goodman writes:
In the past decade, we have charted the middle-aging of female models
and role models. Women who are fortysomething are being allowed out in
public, although they almost always wear a label that reads: "still." Still attrac-
tive at 40. Still youthful at 46.
But . .'. women are only being given an extension on aging .... The
culture is telling women they can be younger longer. It is not welcoming old
women.
Ellen Goodman, The Aging Battle, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 19, 1992, at 21.
178. Pamela Whitesides, Flight Attendant Weight Policies: A Title VII Wrong Without a
Remedy, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 175, 175 (1990). Southwest Airlines, for example, required
its flight attendants to promote its "sexy image and fulfill its public promise to take
passengers skyward with 'love.'" Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 293
(N.D. Tex. 1981).
179. Whitesides, supra note 178, at 177.
180. See, e.g., In re National Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 269 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (holding
that weight maximums do not violate Title VII because they apply equally to men and
women); Jarrell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Va. 1977) (same),
affd, 577 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978); Cox v. Delta Air Lines, 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
1 7600 (S.D. Fla. 1976) (upholding weight restrictions as acceptable grooming standards),
affd mem., 553 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1977).
181. Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982) (en bane), cert.
dismissed, 460 U.S. 1074 (1983).
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part by agreeing to a more liberal weight chart, allowing for three
additional pounds at ages 35, 45, and 55, successively."8
Airlines have begun changing their policies even before- being
hauled into court. Teresa Fischette, a ticket agent at Logan Inter-
national Airport in Boston, was fired by Continental when she
refused to wear makeup. She had never worn makeup and did not
think that cosmetics had anything to do with her job. A rule re-
quiring all female groundworkers to wear makeup was part of the
airline's code on personal appearance." Fischette's termination
set off protests against Continental, including one at company
offices in which picketers chanted, "Better service, lower fares, it
doesn't matter what you wear."'" After the negative publicity,
Continental offered to reinstate Fischette, including providing her
with back pay, and changed the customer-service appearance stan-
dards to "guidelines" instead of "rules."'"
The law should applaud and reinforce this trend away from
rigid weight restrictions and cosmetic requirements. When employ-
ment depends on appearance, a woman's preoccupation with her
body is intensified. The phenomenon of women who endure severe
diets and develop eating disorders is one consequence of the fact
that their jobs may depend on their weight. The law should en-
courage employers and customers to acknowledge talent and good
service, not just good looks. Instead of perpetuating stereotypical
myths that flight attendants are sexy bombshells looking for
wealthy male passengers to marry, the public should be encour-
aged to recognize them as professionals performing a very difficult
job. The law can facilitate the breakdown of arcane notions by
proscribing policies that foster stereotypes and are in no way relat-
ed to job performance.
3. Hairstyles. The choice of a hairstyle is an important way
of expressing one's self and is closely tied to an individual's body
image."8 The courts have been active in proscribing how both
women and men may wear their hair in employment and school
settings.1" A stinging example of the courts' insensitivity to this
182. Whitesides, supra note 178, at 215.
183. Airline Retracts Rule Requiring Makeup Use, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1991, at A19.
184. About-Face, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., May 20, 1991, at 19.
185. I&
186. See Caldwell, supra note 1, at 383.
187. Courts have generally ruled against male employees with long hair. See, e.g.,
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issue is Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc.s The plaintiff, Renee
Rogers, a black woman, argued that American Airlines discrimi-
nated against her as a black woman by categorically forbidding her
to wear a braided hairstyle.1 9 The court treated her race and sex
claims independently and would not acknowledge that the policy
could be discriminatory without affecting all women or all blacks,
although it discriminated against black women. 19°
The court further demeaned Rogers's claim by asserting that
she only began braiding her hair after it was popularized by Bo
Derek in the movie "10."' 191 In reality, black actress Cicely Tyson
had introduced braids into popular American culture a decade
earlier.192 Moreover, the wearing of braids by black women is
not new; braids have been worn for centuries around the
world.1" The choice to wear their hair in braids is an important
political and cultural statement for black women. It is a "survival
mechanism" for black culture and a way to fight "western
standards of physical beauty.""t By denying women like Rogers
the freedom to wear their hair as they wish, the court not only
Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc)
(holding that employer's haircut requirement was not sex discrimination given the prevail-
ing views in the community toward men with long hair); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488
F.2d 1333, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that hair-length regulations are "logically indis-
tinguishable" from "the requirement that men and women use separate toilet facilities or
that men not wear dresses"); Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1124
n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Douglas, J., concurring and dissenting) (noting that some employers
would see "'non-conventional' hair growth [as] a very real personal threat to those who
support the status quo") (quoting Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973)).
In the school context, the reasons administrators and courts supply for regulations
are equally stereotypical. See Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1076 (8th Cir. 1971) (not-
ing principal's explanation that boys with long hair are more "rowdy" and that allowing
males to grow long hair would lead to "confusion over appropriate dressing room and
restroom facilities"); Copeland v. Hawkins, 352 F. Supp. 1022, 1024 (E.D. Ill. 1973) (not-
ing principal's testimony that requiring boys to have short hair is important because oth-
erwise "it might be difficult to tell boys from girls" and, because boys participate in
athletics, short hair is beneficial because it will dry faster after they shower). The courts
in these cases, however, did not find the regulations to be justified.
188. 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
189. Id. at 231.
190. Id. at 231-32. For discussions of compound discrimination, see Madeline Morris,
Stereotypic Alchemy: Transformative Stereotypes and Antidiscrimination Law, 7 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 251 (1989); Elaine W. Shoben, Compound Discrimination: The Interaction of
Race and Sex in Employment Discrimination, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793 (1980).
191. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232.
192. Caldwell, supra note 1, at 379.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 383.
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denied their cultural affiliations but also minimized their chances
of having a positive body image.
It is especially difficult for black women to meet the white
Barbie doll standard, which does not incorporate black physical
characteristics and does not acknowledge black physical character-
istics as beautiful. The need to change one's appearance in an
effort to gain legitimacy causes tremendous psychological
harm."9 A black person "should not have to look more white in
order to keep [her] job."1"
IV. CONCLUSION
Although at first glance, topless sunbathing may seem like an
insignificant issue, it is symbolic of the power inequities that per-
sist in American society. Women's bodies will never look like
men's bodies, but this difference must not be used to foster stereo-
typical notions about women or to inhibit women's choices. In-
creasing numbers of women will not accept a law, defined solely
by the male point of view, that tells them that their desires do not
matter and that their bodies must be hidden in shame. Instead of
reinforcing unattainable beauty norms, the law can play a signifi-
cant role in helping women overcome the discomfort and guilt
they feel about their bodies by allowing for alternatives and per-
sonal choices in areas that have an impact on appearance and
body image. Only when the law acknowledges that all the sizes,
shapes, and colors that women come in are acceptable and valu-
able can women begin to overcome their status as outsiders.
195. Id. Even some black dolls have been considered to' resemble nothing more than
"white dolls with dark paint." Carolyn Battista, Teaching Children to Celebrate Diversity,
N.Y. TIMs, July 28, 1991, at 12CN3.
196. WOLF, supra note 15, at 55.
1993]
